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FULL OF SOUND AND FURY, SIGNIFYING NOTHING: SECOND CIRCUIT CHIDES 
EMPLOYER’S UNFAIR ARBITRATION TERMS, YET STILL ENFORCES AGREEMENT 
By 




 In Ragone v. Atlantic Video at Manhattan Center, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced an arbitration agreement after the 
defendants waived provisions that may have been unenforceable and 
unconscionable.1 The Court also found that ESPN, a non-signatory to the 
arbitration agreement, could arbitrate the dispute as its business was linked to the 




 Rita Ragone worked as a make-up artist for Atlantic Video (“AVI”) from 
February 2005 until April 2006.3 During that time, ESPN, the cable sports channel, 
operated its morning sports show, “Cold Pizza,” out of AVI’s studio in New York 
City.4  AVI fired Ragone in 2006, which Ragone alleged was done in response to 
her allegations of sexual harassment.5 In response to her firing, Ragone filed a 
claim alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (“Title VII”) as well as claims under the New York State Human Rights 
Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.6 She claimed that the defendants 
“subjected her to ‘continuous sexual harassment [which] made [her] work 
                                                 
* Michael C. Barbarula is a 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate at the Dickinson School of Law of 
the Pennsylvania State University. 
1 Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2010). 
2 Id. at 128. 
3 Id. at 118. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 117. 




environment hostile, abusive and untolerable.’”7 Her employment contract 
contained an agreement to arbitrate “any and all claims arising out of my 
employment or its termination.”8 Additionally, the arbitration agreement contained 
the following clauses, which Ragone claimed were unconscionable and therefore 
unenforceable: 
 
(a) impermissibly shortens the statute of limitations [for 
bringing any demand for arbitration] to ninety days, (b) 
requires that attorney’s fees must be awarded to the 
prevailing party, (c) it prevents the plaintiff from appealing 
the arbitrator’s award in court, and (d) it denies the plaintiff 
some of her rights in court by limiting her discovery rights 
and eliminating her right to a jury trial.9 
 
The arbitration provision included a severability clause, which stipulated that all 
clauses found to be contrary to law must be modified in accordance “with the 
applicable federal and/or New York law.”10 
 The district court applied New York law and found the arbitration 
agreement was not procedurally unconscionable because Ragone “failed to show 
that AVI engaged in high-pressure tactics or deception in procuring her signature 
on the agreement.”11 In addition, the court rejected Ragone’s claim of 
unconscionability based on her not understanding the agreement.12 The court 
reasoned that she couldhave asked questions, studied the provision, or had a lawyer 
                                                 
7 Id; see also Pl. Compl. ¶ 21. 
8 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 118. 
9 Id. at 118-19. 
10 Id. at 119. 
11 Id. at 119-20. 
12 Id. at 120. 
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look at them.13 AVI agreed to waive the fee and statute of limitation provisions and 
argued that the provision banning appeal did not preclude Ragone from attempting 
to vacate the arbitration decision in federal court.14 These stipulations helped the 
district court conclude that the agreement was not unconscionable.15 Finally, the 
court found that although ESPN was a non-signatory, it could compel arbitration 
because “it is clear that [Ragone’s] claims of unlawful harassment and retaliation 
against AVI and ESPN rely on the concerted actions of both defendants and are 






The Second Circuit explained its review of this case would be de novo.17 
The Court pointed out that the arbitration agreement specifically stated that 
“claims of sexual harassment” are arbitrable.18 Additionally, because the FAA is 
the controlling law, “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, 
or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements.”19 
Ragone claimed the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, and the Court 
noted the New York law of arbitration defined unconscionability as “so grossly 
unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the mores and business practices of 
the time and place as to be unenforceable according to its literal terms.”20 For a 
claim of unconscionability to stand, the agreement must be both procedurally and 
                                                 





18 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 120. 
19 Id. at 121 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
20 Id. (quoting Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 532 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988)). 




substantively unconscionable.21 Procedural unconscionability deals with “the 
contract formation process and the alleged lack of a meaningful choice,” while 
substantive unconscionability relates to a contract’s content.22 
 The Second Circuit held that the agreement was not procedurally 
unconscionable.23 The Court rejected Ragone’s claim that she was offered the 
agreement “on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis” because such a claim is not sufficient 
under New York law to make an agreement procedurally unconscionable.24 Next, 
the Second Circuit rejected Ragone’s assertion that she did not read the arbitration 
agreement and could not be forced to arbitrate because it would “allow a party to 
avoid his legal obligation to read a document carefully before signing it just 
because the document is an arbitration agreement under which Title VII claims 
could be arbitrated.”25 Third, Ragone’s lack of a college degree was not a basis to 
claim procedural unconscionability.26 Therefore, the agreement was not 
procedurally unconscionable.27 
 Ragone also argued that her agreement was substantively unconscionable 
and that the district court erred by avoiding consideration of any of the disputed 
terms of the agreement because AVI waived them.28 She believed the agreement 
should have been considered as a whole.29 While the Court noted that this is a 
plausible argument, it was still inclined to reject it.30 First, the severability clause 
of the agreement still applies because the district court did not find any provision 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 121-22 (quoting State v. Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)). 
23 Ragone, 595 F.3d. at 122. 
24 Id.; see Nayal v. HIP Network Servs. IPA, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 566, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (citing cases). 
25 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 122; see Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 150 
(2d Cir. 2004). 
26 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 122. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 123. 
30 Id. 
COMMENTS ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
 
289 
of the agreement contrary to law.31 The district court also refused to trigger the 
severability clause and the question of whether the clause could save the agreement 
is not raised in the appeal.32 Next, regarding the clause forbidding appeal, Ragone 
did not present any evidence where she would be forbidden from moving to vacate 
an award in federal court.33 In terms of the two remaining challenged clauses, the 
limitation of demand for arbitration and the award of attorneys’ fees, the Court 
noted that Ragone did not present any New York case law where a court found 
waiver of arbitration clauses was unacceptable.34 Instead, the Court cited New 
York case law supporting the waiver.35 In summation, the Second Circuit held that 
the agreement was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable; thus, the 
Second Circuit was unwilling to void the arbitration agreement.36 
  However, the Court was not enthusiastic about its holding.37 It noted that 
while a court shall compel arbitration when “the prospective litigant effectively 
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,” the arbitration 
agreement will be voided when the agreement “act[s] as a prospective waiver of a 
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”38 The Court was unsure whether it 
would uphold the agreement had AVI not waived the contested portions of the 
agreement.39 The Court agreed with Ragone’s assertion that enforcement of these 
agreements  
 
                                                 
31 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 123. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 124. 
35 Id.; see In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F.Supp.2d 385, 411-12 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that “defendant’s offer to pay arbitration-related fees and waiver 
of fee-shifting meant plaintiff could not rely on arbitration costs as ground for finding 
arbitration agreement unconscionable.”) and Schreiber v. K-Sea Transp. Corp., 9 N.Y.3d 
331 (N.Y. 2007) (holding that plaintiff should not be forced to pay for arbitration when 
doing so would preclude him from seeking arbitration). 
36 Ragone, 595 F.3d. at 125. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637, 637 n.19 (1985)). 
39 Id. 




creates highly undesirable incentives to employers because it 
teaches employers to create as oppressive and one-sided 
arbitration agreements as possible (with the hopes of chilling 
employment discrimination actions) while maintaining the 
expectation that [they] can still enforce arbitration by simply 
stating ‘Never Mind’ to all the unenforceable provisions that 
never should have been included in the first place.40  
 
However, because the Second Circuit felt that Ragone could assert her Title VII 
rights in arbitration, it is not necessary to void the entire agreement.41 
 
B. Arbitration with ESPN 
 
 The Second Circuit lastly considered the district court’s finding that 
Ragone must arbitrate her claims with ESPN, although ESPN did not sign the 
agreement and are never mentioned in the employment contract.42 Under the 
doctrine of estoppel,  
 
[a] non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a 
signatory to that agreement to arbitrate a dispute where a 
careful review of ‘the relationship among the parties, the 
contracts they signed…and the issues that had arisen’ among 
them discloses that ‘the issues the nonsignatory is seeking to 
resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement the 
party has signed.’43   
                                                 
40 Id. at 126. 
41 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 126. 
42 Id. (quoting Choctaw Generation Ltd. P’ship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 
406 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
43 Id. at 126-27. 




The Court agreed with the district court’s finding that a relationship existed 
between Ragone, AVI, and ESPN, which supported the doctrine of estoppel.44 
While ESPN was not in the arbitration agreement, Ragone understood ESPN to be 
her co-employer.45 The Court then distinguished this case from Ross v. American 
Express Co., where the Second Circuit found that American Express could not 
compel arbitration as a non-signatory because “the plaintiffs do not know Amex 
from Adam.”46 This case is different because of the relationship between Ragone 
and ESPN, in which Ragone knew she would work with ESPN personnel in the 
course of her employment.47 Therefore, because of this relationship, ESPN could 




 Ragone presents interesting issues for future litigation of arbitration 
agreements.  First, the Court mentioned that there could be certain circumstances 
in which defendants could waive troubling portions of arbitration agreements and 
the court would still find the agreement unconscionable.49 A voidable arbitration 
agreement must be one that a plaintiff “may [not] vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum.”50 The Court cited only one case in which an 
arbitration agreement was held to be void under this circumstance, but the 
defendants never waived the disputed clauses.51 Therefore, until the Second Circuit 
expresses what type of clause would void an agreement even if waived, those who 
                                                 
44 Id. at 127. 
45 Id. 
46 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 127; see Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
47 Ragone, 595 F.3d at 128. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 125. 
50 Id. 
51 Id; see In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009). 




create arbitration agreements still seem to be free to put in strong language that 
may frighten the other party from bringing an arbitration claim, only to waive that 
claim if an action is brought. 
 Second, the Second Circuit uses this case to show when a non-signatory 
can compel arbitration. When an employee understands the non-signatory to be a 
co-employer, the facts of the dispute are intertwined with the third party, and the 
employment contract stipulates that all controversies will be subject to arbitration, 
the non-signatory can estop the employee from seeking to avoid arbitration.52 This 
case differs from Ross v. American Express Co. because the plaintiffs had neither 
interaction nor knowledge of American Express at all.53 It will be interesting to see 
if the Second Circuit chooses to expand the circumstances under which a third 
party can compel arbitration. If the Court does not distinguish its holding at a later 
date, it seems that all employees who sign an employment contract with one party 
but who know they will work for another company can be estopped from avoiding 
arbitration when a dispute arises with the third-party employer. 
                                                 
52 Ragone, 595 F.3d. at 127-28. 
53 Id. at 125; see Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 146.  
